Governance and Governmentality of Sport by Grix, J & Harris, S
Grix, J and Harris, S (2016)Governance and Governmentality of Sport. In:
Routledge Handbook of Sport and Politics. Routledge International Hand-
books . Routledge, pp. 3-15. ISBN 9781317646679
Downloaded from: http://e-space.mmu.ac.uk/621305/
Version: Accepted Version
Publisher: Routledge
DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315761930
Please cite the published version
https://e-space.mmu.ac.uk
1 
 
Governance and Governmentality of Sport 
Jonathan Grix and Spencer Harris 
 
 
Introduction 
A number of issues have ensured the rise in prominence of the term ‘governance’ in relation to 
sport in recent years. First, a series of scandals have taken place associated with the governance 
of sporting structures commonly referred to as management corruption (e.g. FIFA), Second, a 
series of problems associated with competition in sport commonly referred to as competition 
corruption (e.g. doping in sport). Third, governments globally appear to be increasingly 
intervening in sport policy for non-sporting – and mostly political – ends. Finally, scholars have 
grappled with the term in order to explain a change in the manner in which public policy is 
delivered in a number of advanced democracies. ‘Governance’, as a concept, has started to be 
used in sports studies to understand sport more often since the early 2000s. This is despite the 
fact that sports studies is relatively slow at taking on concepts from ‘main’ academic disciplines, 
as the trajectory of the core terms from sociology, ‘social capital’, and from international 
relations, ‘soft power’, show. The rise to prominence of ‘governance’ followed the development 
in most advanced capitalist states and many ‘emerging’ of a mixture of New Public Management 
– that is, a ‘devolved’ central power and a desire to deliver public policy more efficiently. New 
Public Management appears to be an almost universally accepted governance type that is 
ideologically-driven, purports to allow policy practitioners autonomy from a centralized state, 
while ‘steering’ from behind the scenes.  
 
Sport governance takes place at many levels, perhaps most clearly at the domestic and the 
international level of governance. The former concerns itself with how sport policy is delivered, 
how sport is funded and which type of organisations make up the so-called ‘sportscape’, 
including National Sport Organisations (NSOs). International governance of sport concerns 
itself with those organisations that are responsible for trans-national sport, for example, the 
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World Anti-Doping Agency, the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), 
FIFA (Federation Internationale de Football Association) and the IOC (International Olympic 
Committee). Such global organisations set the context within which NSOs operate; decisions 
made at a supra-national level often impact on and directly affect NGBs and their policies. The 
governance of sport is, therefore, not just a matter for individual nations. Key actors in world 
politics, for example, the United Nations (UN), and increasingly the European Union (EU) and 
the Council of Europe, have a direct impact on national sport. An example of agenda setting 
policy at supra-national level is the European Commission’s 2007 White Paper on sport, which 
suggests member states ought to encourage a greater role for equal opportunities in sport. This is 
likely, in time, to force traditionally gendered sports such as golf to change their archaic policies 
and practices. The focus in this chapter, is, however, on the domestic or national level of 
governance and we do so by arguing that the so-called ‘governance narrative’, outlining a shift 
from big, central government to devolved ‘governance’ of policy, does not hold for the sport 
policy community. Further, we propose that fusing insights from the literature on ‘governance’ – 
together with those from ‘governmenality’ – can be fruitfully used to shed light on understanding 
the sport policy community. This offers a new analytical framework to assess the governance 
context in which the policy process evolves rather than a specific approach to policy analysis. 
The chapter unfolds as follows: after an overview of the ‘governance’ debate we introduce a ‘new 
governmentality’ approach, we then set out the community sport policy context before analysing 
community sport from a new governmentality perspective. 
 
Governance and the ‘governance narrative’ 
Issues around ‘governance’ have become increasingly important in the last 30 years, as sport has 
become more politicised and as governments have invested more into sport. With heavy 
financial investment comes strict accountability and the need to modernise often archaic 
practices. In the world of sport this has led to a number of key tensions, for sport in many 
countries has been – and still is to a large extent – run by amateur volunteers. The delivery of 
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sport policy in the majority of advanced capitalist states or advanced liberal democracies runs 
from government departments via NSOs (in the US the Olympic Organisation distributes 
monies to NSOs). It is clear to see how increasing levels of government funding and interest can 
give rise to difficulties in sport policy delivery: as modern, technocratic modes of governance 
meet archaic, amateur sport structures there is bound to be friction. Two strands of literature are 
of interest in understanding the manner in which sport is governed at the domestic level: the so-
called ‘governance narrative’ literature and Foucault’s ideas about power encapsulated in the 
concept of ‘governmentality’. Why this is of interest to sport politics is also clear: the domestic 
governance of sport covers key issues such as the funding for NSOs (who gets what, when and 
how), the mechanisms developed to monitor them (the checks and balances) and the effects 
such systems have on long-term sport development.  
 
Only recently has sports studies looked to the mature debates in political science and public 
administration concerning the state’s changing role in the delivery of public policy. Yet, the so-
called ‘governance narrative’, slowly becoming the new orthodoxy in political science (Marsh 
2008a), is more often than not presented as the key approach to understanding recent 
developments in public policy in leading text books on the subject (see Coxall, Robins and Leach 
2003, Dorey, 2005, Hill, 2009). The ‘governance narrative’ is a broad-brush approach that can 
usefully assist in ‘framing’ particular studies of the sport policy area, ranging from those dealing 
with issues of meta-governance down to studies involving street-level bureaucrats, or both. The 
focus of the original work on ‘governance’ was the ‘Westminster style’ of Government (for 
example, Australia, Canada and New Zealand), but general principles hold for the majority of 
advanced capitalist states investing heavily into sport. In particular, how governments fund elite 
sport, the mechanisms in place to make sports organisations accountable for the funds they 
receive and the criteria and ideology upon which such a system rests.  
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In a nutshell, the ‘governance narrative’ suggests a major shift in politics and public policy from 
‘big’ Government to governance through networks, a wide array of ‘partnerships’ and devolved 
bodies, thereby bringing policy closer to the street level and thus society. ‘Partnership’ working in 
particular, especially in sport policy delivery, has been championed strongly. This shift has led to 
the erosion of central Governmental power and with it, the state’s ability to determine and 
deliver policy (Bevir and Rhodes 2006; 2008, Skelcher 2000). The diffusion of power moves 
from an hierarchical, top-down delivery of policy, to one that is side-ways, with governance 
through a series of networks in which a wide variety of interests are represented.  
 
The application of this approach to public policy in the UK has been critiqued for not capturing 
how the sport policy sector is governed. In particular Goodwin and Grix (2011) and Grix and 
Phillpots (2011) have shown that sport policy (and a number of other sectors) is a ‘deviant’ case 
and as such does not fit this ideal type. This leads to a number of very interesting questions that 
shed light on the most salient aspects of the discussion around domestic governance. For 
example, why does sport policy (and others) not fit the notion of devolved, dispersed power 
among a variety of actors with increased autonomy from the central executive? After all, there is 
clearly a trend to ‘agencification’ in the sport policy area, including arm’s length agencies, the 
rapid growth of ‘partnerships’, networks, charities, advisory bodies, boards, commissions, 
councils and other non-governmental bodies. The process described by the ‘governance 
narrative’ does not result in a ‘hollowing out’ of the state, but, perhaps paradoxically, rather in an 
increased capacity for central state control in most mature democracies (see Taylor 2000). The 
underlying, hierarchical power relations and resource-dependence between networks, 
partnerships and Government remain intact. The paradox arises between surface observation 
(the growth of devolved bodies) and the underlying power relations of networks and 
partnerships involved in policy making and delivery. And this surface observation is usually 
enough evidence to confirm a shift from big, interventionist ‘government’ to more autonomous 
governance by networks and partnerships (Bevir and Rhodes 2008, Marsh 2008b), a central tenet 
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of the ‘governance narrative’. Therefore, the ‘governance narrative’ ideal type does not account 
for the continuance of ‘asymmetrical network governance’ (Goodwin and Grix 2010) between 
Government and resource-dependent actors, which exist in both elite and grass-roots policy 
delivery in the UK (see Newman 2005, for a critique of elements of the ‘governance narrative’). 
This is an important point and one that has wider significance beyond the UK case. As discussed 
below, such an understanding of ‘governance’ – whereby ‘devolved’ bodies of public policy 
delivery do not lead to more open, democratic processes, but can be read as a state strategy for 
control – touches on many of the areas central to Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’.  
 
On the surface the ‘governance narrative’ would appear to correctly characterise the sport policy 
sector in the UK. There is no doubt that there is a multitude of organisations, committees and 
charities involved in sport delivery resulting in one of the most ‘divided, confused and conflictive 
policy communities in British Politics’ (Roche, 1993, 78) for this very reason. There are a 
bewildering array of actors – many with overlapping and unspecified roles – involved in the 
delivery of sport policy, including non-departmental public bodies (for example, the funding 
agencies for grass roots and elite sport, Sport England and UK Sport), a Sports Minister, an 
Olympics Minister, a UK Sports Institute, the British Olympic Association, 46 NSOs, 49 County 
Sport Partnerships and Local Authorities all working in one way or another together with the 
Government Department, DCMS (Department of Culture, Media and Sport) to deliver sport-
related services. This is further complicated by the fact that there are private actors, charities, 
not-for-profit organisations, government-near bodies and so on making up the sportscape. 
However, inherent in this system – depending on how wealthy the NSOs are – are asymmetrical 
power relationships, mostly driven by dependency on central government resource. This ties in 
neatly with discussions around ‘governmentality’.  
 
Foucault put forward this term – which he coined ‘the art of government’ (1991) - as a way of 
capturing how governments manage to exert power over subjects by using techniques to ensure 
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individuals govern themselves, but in line with the government’s aims and objectives. That is, 
there is no overt use of force, but ‘Increasingly, government seeks not to govern per se, but to 
promote individual and institutional conduct that is consistent with government objectives’ 
(Raco and Imrie, 2000, 2191). The manner in which this is carried out by governments is to offer 
autonomy, but with strings attached (Piggen et. al., 2009, 89). And this is where sport policy 
comes in. The UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, to name but a few states, have 
introduced ‘modernisation’ programmes to public policy delivery ‘designed (ostensibly) to 
empower and autonomize NSOs’ (Green and Houlihan, 2006, 49). This has been accompanied, 
however, by a growing regime of centrally-set targets, directives and sanctions (Grix, 2009). Sam 
(2009, 505) has found similar tendencies in New Zealand sport and states that through 
‘modernisation’:  
 
….traditional, volunteer ‘kitchen table’ administration is meant to be replaced 
with more formalized operations and an adherence to established management 
practices such as strategic planning, and the use of key performance indicators 
in monitoring and evaluations. 
 
 
New governmentality 
Our conceptualization of new governmentality combines key elements from the governance 
narrative and governmentality.  Specifically, we are interested in the macro context presented by 
the governance narrative. Policy agents today operate in an increasingly open, democratic and 
autonomous policy community. We also highlight the possibility that the ideals of a democratic 
and ‘newly’ empowered policy community represent little more than the state’s most recent 
strategy to retain control. In this respect, the process of governmentality reveals the art of 
government, the way in which governing authorities manage the conduct of individuals and 
groups: ‘to govern, in this sense, is to control the possible field of actions of others’ (Foucault, 
2002, 341 in Bulley & Sokhi-Bulley, 2014). Thus, new governmentality can be described as an 
intentional government strategy which promotes the ideals of shifted power from central 
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government to networked-agents whilst using a range of tactics to retain control and to ensure 
that conduct is aligned with government objectives (Rose, 1999).  
 
Examples of new governmentality in England include such things as the Localism Act, the 
ostensible aspiration to move decision-making power and resources from central Government to 
local communities. At the same time government maintain control by requiring that communities 
fulfil financial conditions and engage with ongoing performance management requirements. 
Alternatively, the key tenets of the ‘Big Society’ reflect the essence of the governance narrative. 
The Big Society can best be described as a major programme of modernization, a model 
representing a slimmer, more efficient government focused on engaging society, promoting 
social responsibility, actively encouraging community control and self-management (Bulley & 
Sokhi-Bulley, 2014), and re-energising people power as the key solution to a broken society 
(Cameron, 2009). These highly vaunted virtues reflect the key attributes of the governance 
narrative, not least the step away from the traditional, hierarchical Westminster mode of 
governance and the step toward a new democratic order. However, further examination reveals 
‘the government as a series of tactics for managing conduct, as a mentality, ... to spread 
responsibility as one of disseminating and diffusing the exercise of power as government’ (Bulley 
& Sokhi-Bulley, 2014: 465). In other words, government continue to govern; they just do so 
through the use of new and re-invented forms of control. 
 
Before turning to an example of how a ‘new governmentality’ approach could shed light on sport 
policy in the UK, it is important to stress how our conceptualisation differs from the original, 
post-modernist perspective. This is best explained in reference to our starting point, in fact, the 
starting point of all research, whether one likes it or not: that is, the ontological and 
epistemological position in which our new conceptualisation is grounded (see Marsh and 
Furlong, 2002). We have argued at length elsewhere that researchers ought to be explicit about 
their ‘worldviews’ (a ‘lay’ way of summing up a researcher’s meta-theoretical position) as this 
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obviously informs the questions they ask, the methods they draw upon to answer those 
questions and the theoretical frameworks they use to shed light on social phenomena (Authors, 
2002; 2010a). The roots of our conceptualisation of ‘new governmentality’ are to be found ‘on 
the border’ between the research paradigms of ‘interpretivism’ and ‘critical realism’ and thus 
allows for an understanding of this new type of governance that seeks to take into account both 
actors’ beliefs and ideas, but also leave room for structures and institutions in any explanation; 
such a perspective we term ‘hard interpretivism’ (see authors, 2010b for a much more thorough 
discussion).  
 
New governmentality in community sport in England 
While sport policy in the UK is not a new phenomenon, the way in which it is presented, 
governed and delivered has changed considerably over the past 15 years. Relatively broad 
statements concerning indoor sports facilities, playing fields, school sport, inequality in sport and 
talent development have been replaced with precisely defined objectives, time-bound targets, and 
a relatively sophisticated (and, in some cases, costly) means of measurement. This is not to argue 
that all policy is presented this way or that this new form of public presentation is a prerequisite 
for all policy. Clearly, policy comes in many forms. That said, the key sport policy priorities of 
the central government since 2008, school sport, community sport and elite sport have 
undoubtedly been subject to greater precision. This is due to three factors: (i) the increasing 
interest in sport at the highest political levels (Houlihan and Green, 2012); (ii) the considerable 
growth in the public monies (exchequer and lottery funding) allocated to sport, and (iii) the 
broader influence of Government attempts to modernize public services and its commitment to 
New Managerialism involving the application of commercial sector ideas and practices to the 
public sphere (Green, 2009; Grix, 2009).  
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Community sport policy in England is led by Sport England under the direction of the 
Department of Culture, Media and Sport1. There are a number of policy directives that guide the 
work of Sport England encompassing such matters as: supporting volunteers, encouraging talent, 
promoting public value (not private gain), involving the community in decision making, and 
equally distributing funding across England (DCMS, 2015). Central to these directives is the core 
policy for the period 2012-2017: a year-on-year increase in the proportion of people who play 
sport once a week for at least 30 minutes and, in particular, an increase in the percentage of 14 to 
25 year olds playing sport once a week, and a reduction in the proportion of 14 to 25 year-olds 
dropping out of sport. Implementation is led by National Governing Bodies of Sport (NGBs) 
with support from County Sport Partnerships and a range of national agencies including Street 
Games, Dame Kelly Holmes Legacy Trust, Sports Coach UK, Youth Sport Trust, English 
Federation of Disability Sport, Sporting Equals and the Women’s Sports Foundation (see Figure 
1). The specific action plans, programmes, and targets for increased participation reside within 
the Whole Sport Plan of each NGB. These plans are assessed by Sport England and funding 
allocations are awarded to each NGB based on goals and targets as well as the growth potential 
of each sport. For the period 2008-2017, a total of £950 million was invested in NGB whole 
sport plans and the support services of County Sports Partnerships (Sport England, 2015). The 
NGB-CSP partnership represents the institutional delivery arm of community sport policy 
insomuch as it is responsible for translating the NGB whole sport plan into local-level action 
(activities, programmes, promotional campaigns, etc.). In this way the CSP is considered the 
strategic lead agency for sport for the sub-region and thus best placed to support the NGB in the 
implementation of its Whole Sport Plan. Measuring progress against the policy objective is 
achieved through the Active People Survey. This survey collects a range of information about 
frequency and type of sports participation and allows analysis of changes in sports participation 
across the England population from 2005/6 to the present day. 
 
                                                 
1 Each of the home country Sports Councils (Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and England) has lead responsibility for 
community sports policy in their respective country. 
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Figure 1 here 
 
The community sport policy process is an interesting case study when examining governance in 
England. On the one hand, the community sport landscape—that is, the range of agencies and 
partnerships that make up the delivery system for community sport—appear to present an 
apposite example of the governance narrative, in particular the creation of ostensible democratic 
network structures and the apparent shift of power from central government to local 
communities. However, these structural arrangements reveal significant power imbalances across 
the various agencies (Grix, 2010). At the same time, against the broader governmental policy 
context of Localism, Big Society and power devolved to networks, NGBs and CSPs must 
respond to the various strategies of government that have been designed to influence, manage or 
control policy delivery (Harris, 2013). In particular, we draw attention to three examples of 
strategies that reflect new governmentality: the structure of the community sport system, the 
Whole Sport Plan process, and the performance management system. These examples are drawn 
from empirical work focusing on the beliefs and ideas of actors within the networks themselves, 
specifically senior managers of NGBs, CEOs and board members of CSPs, and senior managers 
of local authorities. 
 
The structure of the community sport system 
The rhetoric relating to the community sport delivery system suggests a simplified, focused and 
democratic partnership combining sport and local community interests. On the surface the 
networked partnerships2 ‘signify equalities of power, shared values and the establishment of 
common agendas and goals’ (Newman, 2005, 81) together with the provision of skills, expertise 
and financial resource—coordinated at the street-level—to drive growth in community sports 
participation. In reality, the community sport policy community reflects the Weberian notion of 
                                                 
2 We refer to these networks as networked partnerships as they bring together a range of existing sport-based partnerships (e.g. 
NGBs, county sports associations, clubs, etc.) and community-based partnerships (e.g. County Sports Partnerships, local 
authorities, Clinical Commissioning Groups, etc.)  into a broader network focused primarily on community sport.  
 
11 
 
bureaucratic rationality, a top-down policy led by a narrow coalition made up primarily of 
government departments and NDPBs (e.g. Sport England) on down to NGBs.  
 
We have a very heavy top-down system ... that is all well and good, but if you 
don’t know what is going on at the local level, who has agreed to do what, 
what is working and what is not, you’re not likely to be very successful 
(Principal Sports & Recreation Manager, Metropolitan Borough Council).  
 
The experience of the last four years has shown that most NGB strategies 
were top-down, were focused on the national level, and most did not know 
what they wanted to do at the local level. You could go and sit down and have 
a meeting with them and they would not be able to articulate their priorities 
for [the area] or how they wanted us to help them (Operations Manager, CSP) 
 
Indeed, research into the community sport policy process underscores a top-down policy 
subsystem characterised by its hierarchy and consequent divisions (Harris, 2013). The hierarchy 
or patterns of authority across the policy subsystem reflect the resource dependency of the 
agencies that make up the system. Thus, the authority of ‘the principal’ cascades down the 
community sport structure whereby the various ‘principals’ (the principal varies according to 
level) attempts to control and manage the behaviour of various ‘agents’. To clarify, at the 
national level, the capacity and authority of the national-level agent (Sport England) is heavily 
dependent on the resources it receives from the principal (DCMS). Similarly, the ability of NGBs 
(agents) to secure funding for growing and sustaining sports participation is dependent on the 
resources it receives from the principal (Sport England). This pattern of authority and 
dependence cascades down the community sport structure and influences the nature of the 
relationships between NGBs, CSPs, local authorities and community sports clubs. Thus, from a 
rational perspective, it is in the agents’ interest to cooperate and support the principal or 
governing authority, and reflect their ideals and norms, rather than bargain or enter into conflict 
regarding the nature of community sport policy. This is not to imply that agents unquestionably 
comply with principal requirements and refrain from subverting policy demands, but the 
hierarchical structure and the systems established to support principal control do reinforce the 
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more centralised, traditional Westminster model of governance, as opposed to a shift of power 
to the local-level.  
 
The notion of democratic governance belies the nature of the enforced partnership between 
NGBs and CSPs and creates significant structural problems that hinder cooperation and 
collaboration across the community sport landscape. The partnership is described as enforced, as 
agencies, in particular CSPs, must comply with the minimum standards set out in Sport 
England’s core specification in order to receive funding. While the networked partnership 
between NGBs and CSPs may work well in isolated cases there are fundamental flaws in the 
structure, not least in the extent to which partners cooperate and engage with one another, and 
the degree to which there is consensus on the leadership role of NGBs and CSPs.  The problem 
of engagement primarily relates to the broader conception of the CSP and its role in the strategic 
leadership of sport across the sub-region. When CSPs were created in the early 2000s, one of 
their core functions was to provide leadership and coordination for sport across their area. CSPs 
were conceived as broader partnerships, umbrella organisations that would represent local 
authorities, county sport associations and others involved in sport. The CSP would be the voice 
for sport for the area, the lead agency responsible for enhancing communication and 
coordinating efforts to grow sports participation and enhance talent. Whilst this broader 
conception of the partnership remains a feature of CSPs, to fulfill their role effectively, two 
conditions must be met. First, the CSP must develop and pursue a strategic role. Second, it must 
be viewed and sanctioned as the strategic lead for sport by the agencies. Unfortunately, 
community sport appears to have a structure where, in some counties, the CSP assumes the 
former without the latter having taken place. For example: ‘first and foremost we are a strategic 
agency’ (Director, CSP); ‘we have got to be seen in our area as taking the lead, we manage 
programmes and utilise local authorities and community networks to deliver’ (NGB Lead 
Officer, CSP). In contrast, NGBs and local authorities reveal a range of perspectives, which 
underscore their independence and resistance to leadership from an outside source. Indeed, 
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rather than representing a collective approach in which the CSP and local authorities work hand-
in-hand, the local authority perspectives illustrate a more complex and, at times, divisive 
relationship where they feel that the CSP are attempting to take a lead role or dictate strategic 
and operational matters, where the local authority themselves felt better placed to do so:  
 
The CSP talks about being the strategic lead, strategic lead this, strategic lead 
that...but actually, strategic leadership comes at the local level...there is an 
argument that there is no need for CSPs. If NGBs worked more effectively 
with local authorities there would be more resources available to coordinate 
programmes in order to sustain and grow participation (Sports Development 
Manager).  
 
Adding to this, other local authority representatives stressed the local community development 
role of municipalities and their traditional role in facilitating sport development as a potential 
cause of tension and general lack of enthusiasm for the partnership: 
 
I don’t think we actually need the CSP...we could do the work ourselves if we 
had the funding. I would argue that we are better placed because we have the 
local links to make these things sustainable, we have the local knowledge and 
understanding to make sure it is needs-based and being delivered where it 
should be delivered, and to make sure that it is clearly coordinated with other 
services and programmes (Community Development Manager, City Council).  
 
The credibility of the partnership is further weakened by some NGBs who claim that the CSP’s 
role in community sport is overstated:  ‘If I’m honest, I don’t spend a lot of hours with them 
through the year, it’s not a priority, my priorities are schools and clubs, and places to play’ 
(Regional Development Manager, Lawn Tennis Association); ‘while I’m mindful of the core 
funding that CSPs receive, it is difficult to drill down to clearly see what value and support the 
CSP can offer’ (Regional Development Manager, Amateur Swimming Association). This 
reinforces the view from local authorities concerning the lack of consensus regarding the place 
of the CSP as the strategic lead for sport for the sub-region and underscores the pervasive nature 
of power and the way in which this intersects with seemingly rational and positive attempts to 
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create strategic leadership for sport at the sub-regional level:  
 
[A] lot of it is about the CSP wanting to be seen as the gatekeeper of sport in 
the area, but they’re not necessarily seen as this. I mean, we would rather do 
the work ourselves than rely on a gatekeeper (County Director, England & 
Wales Cricket Board).  
 
Thus, while the CSP may represent a partnership in name, the original, government-driven, 
broad conception of the partnership to provide a strategic lead and a voice for sport for the sub-
region encompassing local authorities, county sport associations and others has not yet 
transpired. Rather than aiding policy implementation, the deep structures of power underpinning 
the partnership will more likely make the exercise of achieving policy goals more challenging 
than it otherwise might be (Bloyce et al., 2008).  
 
The Whole Sport Plan process 
Despite the limited role of NGBs and CSPs in the formulation of national policy, NGBs play a 
significant role at the next level down, where they translate policy for their sport through their 
Whole Sport Plan. This sets out the ‘community sport policy’ for each NGB, detailing the targets 
and how the targets will be achieved. These plans are then assessed by Sport England and 
funding allocations agreed based on the details of the plan and the growth potential of each 
sport. Clearly, in the context of open and democratic governance, there is an opportunity for 
NGBs to engage key stakeholders in the formulation of its plan. However, the majority of NGBs 
reportedly pursued an insular approach, led by the upper echelons of the organisation. This is 
despite Sport England facilitating a series of roadshows with the aim of improving stakeholder 
engagement in the NGB whole sport planning process, an exercise which was largely viewed as 
being superficial, designed to create the illusion of engagement and consultation while allowing 
NGBs to continue their insular approach to planning. On reflection, this approach reinforces 
three key problems. First, it compromises the basic premise of network governance, that is, 
interacting with stakeholders on important decisions, and fails to secure commitment and 
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consensus from implementing agents (such as local authorities, clubs, Universities, schools, etc.). 
Second, it limits the insight of the NGB to a partial view of the broad context affecting policy, 
therefore remaining ignorant of significant issues that will inhibit policy implementation  (Marsh 
& Smith, 2000). Third, it illuminates the power imbalance across different levels of the 
community sport system, particularly between national-level NGBs, county sport partnerships, 
county sport associations, local authorities and local voluntary sports clubs. As one sport 
representative explained, making reference to the collapse of the British Athletics Federation and 
the creation of UK Athletics, ‘even in the bad old days there was more democratic decision 
making, more sense of ownership of the sport than there is today’ (Chairman, County Athletics 
Association). Others reiterated the sentiment:  ‘one of the big problems is that NGBs devise 
their own plans and programmes and become very attached to them without involving local 
partners’ (Director, CSP); ‘the problem with many NGBs is that they don’t even try ... I mean 
why not come and talk to us? We know what is best for the local area, we represent it’ (Head of 
Culture & Sport, County Council). Such comments not only underline the power imbalance 
inherent within the system but also the alienation that such behaviour cultivates. This, in turn, 
creates and perpetuates a ‘them and us’ culture, and at its extreme, creates an apathetic or hostile 
environment where street- level workers seek to modify or subvert policy because it is unclear or 
fails to relate to the local context within which they operate (Barrett & Fudge, 1981; Lipsky, 
1980). In sum, whilst the autocratic or insular approach of NGBs may offer a relatively quick 
and efficient means of translating policy, it does little to secure the participatory consensus of 
grassroots implementers and is likely to be far more effective in pushing partners apart rather 
than galvanizing collective effort and collaborative capacity. Furthermore, it clearly fails to reflect 
the simplified and clearly coordinated system of delivery promoted by Sport England. 
 
The core specification, the core funding agreement and the performance management system 
In 2008, as a result of the revised strategy and structure for community sport, Sport England 
created a series of tools to strengthen the governance and accountability of the community sport 
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system. These tools included the core specification, the core funding agreement, the 
performance management system and the payment by results scheme. These tools are pertinent 
examples of the techniques of modern managerialism (Newman, 2005). However, they also 
epitomize the tactics of a govern/mentality (Barron, 2005, 984)—the processes of governance—
concerned with shaping, guiding and directing the conduct of agencies and individuals (Gordon, 
1991). While the resource dependency of most community sport agencies means that they 
conform with such requirements, they do so whilst reporting that such techniques adversely 
affect the bigger picture, namely cultivating the NGB-CSP relationship and focusing on 
participation growth. The core specification, core funding and performance management system 
were seen to be useful in some regards, particularly in relation to focusing attention, setting out 
expectations, minimum requirements and contractual obligations. However, such principles, 
specifically the creation of specifications and contracts, could be argued to contradict the very 
notion of network governance. Moreover, from an agents’ perspective the overt emphasis on 
and demands of such processes was seen to unbalance the task-people management orientation 
of the NGB-CSP relationship toward a wholly task-orientation, which in turn was generally 
viewed to be a major step back to the task-heavy days of an outdated public sector, stifling the 
softer skills and attention needed to broker and enhance partnerships and partnership 
interactions: 
Sport England has all those documents like the core specification that we as a 
CSP have to use, but they are just pieces of paper. What is more interesting 
for us is the people behind the plan. The papers sit on the shelf, it’s about 
getting beyond that to actually make it happen. We need to focus more on 
the relationship and how we can work together to achieve our goals (NGB 
Lead Officer, CSP).  
I guess the final thing to say is about the target mentality that we all work in 
now. On the one hand it’s fine, we need direction, we need it to help 
prioritise ... The core specification is a little like that, okay, this is what I need 
to do, what I need to offer to be seen in a good light. But partnership 
working needs to be more genuine, it needs to go beyond this, it requires a 
more open conversation about vision, priorities and roles and responsibilities 
(Chair/Trustee, CSP).  
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Alongside this, the quarterly performance management system was seen to reinforce a short-
term view where the priority was to turn in a ‘good report’. A good report reflects good or 
outstanding performance in a range of specific tasks. The problem here is that many of the tasks 
included in the performance review do not naturally align with or contribute to growth in sports 
participation. For example, a CSP could submit quarterly performance reports over a four-year 
period that were judged to reflect outstanding organizational performance, yet at the same time 
the CSP could witness significant decreases in sports participation in the county. Thus, the 
process drives behaviours, such as focusing attention and allocating resources to achieving short-
term goals, such as achieving ‘excellent’ performance reports, rather than the more challenging, 
longer-term goal of driving growth in mass participation. Simultaneously, the process emphasizes 
recognition and rewards for outstanding performance and high achievement as determined by 
the information provided in the performance report. This approach, what Demming (2000) 
referred to as the ‘deadly disease of management’, encourages agencies to do whatever is 
necessary to present themselves in the best possible light and reinforces an approach whereby 
‘perception rules substance or reality’. 
 
We have to be honest about what is working and what is not. We tend to 
want to say what others want to hear. I think we are still caught up in trying 
to please everybody. I think we should just stop and focus on working with 
those CSPs where it’s working well (Regional Development Manager, 
England Basketball).  
 
We like to present this idea that everything is rosy, everything is wonderful. 
We have to be more prepared to discuss the problems and the things that are 
not working as much as we do those things that are working well (County 
Director, England & Wales Cricket Board).  
 
Thus, the performance management process underpins two significant problems. First, it drives 
a focus on perception over reality, where the desire to present oneself in the best possible light 
prevails over honesty, which in turn influences the norms and culture of the policy sub-system. 
18 
 
Gaming the system for the purpose of submitting an excellent report becomes standard practice. 
Second, and more important, the façade of ‘excellence’ inhibits the sharing of problems, mistakes 
and the more general policy learning that could emerge if a more genuine, democratic, and open 
epistemic community were to exist.  
 
Summary 
In this brief chapter we have attempted to highlight the value of a new approach to policy, ‘new 
governmentality’, in analyzing the governance context in which (sport) policy is made. We did so 
by drawing attention to the dominant position that the concept of ‘governance’ has taken in 
debates on government set policy delivery. Further, we introduced a new ‘hard interpretivist’ 
version of ‘governmentality’, which draws on the concept of governance, but focuses very much 
on the government’s attempt to shape and guide agents’ behaviour according to government 
wishes through – ostensibly – devolving and dispersing power downwards closer to where policy 
is implemented. Such an approach is essential, we believe, especially given the unquestioned 
nature of the system of governance in the majority of advanced capitalist states: New 
Managerialism. Finally, we went on to show – using an empirical example of UK community 
sport policy - how this is not just a lofty academic debate: such a system of governance has a 
real-life impact on how policy is delivered and implemented; it also impact greatly on the 
behaviour of the agents within the organisations and partnerships involved in delivering 
community sport policy.  
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Figure 1: Community sport policy structure 
 
 
 
